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Abstract. The ISO 26262 standard defines functional safety for auto-
motive E/E systems. Since the publication of the first edition of this
standard in 2011, many different safety techniques complying to the
ISO 26262 have been developed. However, it is not clear which parts
and (sub-) phases of the standard are targeted by these techniques and
which objectives of the standard are particularly addressed. Therefore,
we carried out a gap analysis to identify gaps between the safety stan-
dard objectives of the part 3 till 7 and the existing techniques. In this
paper the results of the gap analysis are presented such as we identified
that there is a lack of mature tool support for the ASIL sub-phase and
a need for a common platform for the entire product development cycle.
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1 Introduction
Development of innovative features such as advanced driver assistance systems
in modern day automobiles have led to an increased complexity in product de-
velopment and maintenance. This imposes an increased risk in terms of system
failure that could lead to unacceptable hazards. Thus it becomes crucial to en-
sure functional safety. The ISO 26262 standard [15] defines functional safety for
automotive Electric/Electronic (E/E) safety-related systems. Its objective is to
address possible hazards caused by the malfunctioning behavior of E/E systems
throughout the product development cycle.
Most of the automotive companies have already started using safety analysis,
verification and validation techniques to ensure vehicle safety [22]. One of the
main objectives of the ISO 26262 is that these techniques should be applied as
a standardized methodology for all automobile manufacturers. These techniques
focus mainly on traceability which is the ability to track the safety requirements
from initial concept design till the production and operation phase. Upon trying
to improve the traceability, the researchers seek more techniques for effective
product development process.
The introduction of the ISO 26262 functional safety standard provides more
specific development processes that help to avoid the hazards and threats in
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the development phases. Following steps should be taken to ensure compliance
with the standard: a) The manufacturers should adopt the development pro-
cesses; b) The manufacturers should determine the Automotive Safety Integrity
Level (ASIL) for safety-critical systems; c) The manufacturers should satisfy the
additional requirements.
The standardization process requires the consistency of methods, languages
and tools across all the sub-phases of the software lifecycle as well as system and
hardware development phases as stated in the section 5.4.4 of the ISO 26262 Part
6 [15, p. 4]. In recent years, safety related platforms such as OPENCOSS [6] and
AutoFOCUS3 [2] have been developed. OPENCOSS provides a common safety
certification platform for the railway, avionics and automotive markets. AutoFO-
CUS3 provides a model-based tool for distributed, reactive, embedded software
systems. The consistency can be assured through the availability of a tool that
ensures the compatibility within the ISO 26262 (sub-) phases. The automobile
manufacturers are challenged in the selection of the optimal techniques to en-
sure this compatibility which helps to prove the functional safety. This paper
focuses on examining the gap between the ISO 26262 standard objectives and
state-of-the-art safety related techniques.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we provide
background information on the V-model of the ISO 26262 standard. In Section 3,
we describe the systematic literature review process and the summary of the
papers selected for the analysis. Section 4 presents the gap analysis results and
Section 5 discusses the findings. Finally, we present the concluding remarks and
some related future works.
2 Background
The safety standard ISO 26262 [15] is an adaptation of the functional safety
standard IEC 61508 [14] for automotive E/E systems. Similar to IEC 61508,
ISO 26262 is also a risk-based safety standard. It provides a risk-driven safety
life-cycle for developing safety-critical systems in the automotive domain.
The ISO 26262 consists of ten parts as shown in Figure 1. Part 1, 2, and Part
8 to 10 are out of the scope of this paper, because Part 3 to Part 7 correspond to
the safety life-cycle. The main part of ISO 26262 is structured based upon the
V-model, as well as Part 5 and Part 6. Part 3 and Part 7 focus on the vehicle
level. The main goal of Part 3 is to identify system hazards and risks through
Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA), then derive safety goals and
Functional Safety Concepts (FSC) from them. Part 4 focuses on the system level.
In this part, Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) are derived from FSC. Then
system design can be carried out based on TSR. Part 5 and Part 6 focus on the
subsystem/component level. In these two parts more detailed safety requirements
are derived from TSR. Those safety requirements are assigned to the concrete
subsystems or components for implementation.
In the following section, we present state-of-the-art techniques complying to
the ISO 26262 standard.
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Fig. 1. An overview of the ISO 26262 V-model
3 Systematic Literature Review
We use a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) methodology [16] to obtain state-
of-the-art information on the techniques in the area of the ISO 26262 standard.
In a comprehensive SLR analysis, documents that contain ISO 26262 related
information are analyzed. Sources are collected from various popular resources
such as IEEE [5], ACM [1], Springer [8], SAE [7], and FISITA [3]. Scientific
journal articles, research papers, and industrial technical reports are considered.
Fig. 2. Trend of publications related to the ISO 26262 over a period of time
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Peer-reviewed articles on the topics “ISO 26262” and “vehicle safety”, pub-
lished between 2008 and 2015, are included. We exclude duplicate reports of the
same or similar studies as well as white papers are excluded. After the search and
inclusion/exclusion processes, we identify 120 unique papers. In our findings, we
discover that higher number of papers are published in the concept phase (63
papers) than the development phases (51 papers) i.e., product development,
software development, and hardware development phases of the ISO 26262 V-
model. The remaining six papers are considered as general publications, since
they cover all the phases of the V-model. To further narrow down the search
results, citations are used as a key tool to assess the quality of the identified
papers. Publications between 2013 and 2015 are included.
In the case of concept and product development phases, more than half of
the papers have been cited at least once and number of papers cited more than
five are 18. Figure 2 shows the trend of papers published in each sub-phases from
the selected sources. It can be inferred that the focus of the papers are more on
the improvement of FSC (Functional Safety Concepts) in the conceptual phase
and IVTA (Integration,Validation,Testing and Assessment) in the development
phase. This shows the following observations:
Table 1. Mapping between safety related techniques and safety phases
PHASES SUB PHASES TECHNIQUES IMPORTANT FEATURES REF 
CONCEPT 
PHASE 
ASIL SRGM (Safety 
Reliability Growth 
Model) 
- * Consider all risk factor apart from development 
method. 
[10] 
HIP-HoPs *First Automatic ASIL allocation tool. 
*Applicable for complex large scale systems. 
*Consumes more processing time. 
*Provides less options for ASIL decomposition. 
[17] 
Systems of Linear 
Equations 
*Easy to implement and consumes less processing time. 
*Not proven to be applicable for complex systems. 
*Provides all possible solutions based on Cost 
Optimization for ASIL decomposition. 
[9] 
Exact Solver *Provides all possible solutions based on Cost 
Optimization for ASIL decomposition. 
[15] 
PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT 
PHASE 
Specification of 
Requirements 
IBM Rhapsody *Ensures requirement traceability throughout the 
product life cycle. 
[3] 
Papyrus *Ensures requirement traceability and also can perform 
safety analysis. 
[14] 
Safety 
Validation 
GSN ( Goal 
Structuring 
Notation ) 
*Reduce cost and time during certification process. 
*It also helps to reuse the models. 
*Act as basis for systematic functional safety 
requirements. 
[8] 
SmartTestGen *Integrates different test generation techniques and 
covers maximum test cases to ensure safety.  
[18] 
Time Usage 
Model (TUM) 
*Describe time and data dependencies of the system to 
be tested. 
[19] 
HARDWARE 
DEVELOPMENT 
PHASE 
Safety 
evaluation 
UML complaint 
meta model 
*Provides evaluation of preliminary hardware 
architecture. 
*It supports the design process as the complete 
hardware design including safety evaluation can be 
performed in one model based environment. 
[7] 
SOFTWARE 
DEVELOPMENT 
PHASE 
Architecture 
and 
Implementation 
Simulink Model 
Generator and 
Safety Driver 
Generator 
*This tool enhancement is capable of generating 
Simulink models to support application software 
development. 
*Also for configuring and generating safety drivers for 
initialization, runtime testing and error handling. 
[14] 
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– More additional standardized procedures have been implemented from the
IEC 61508 standard on the conceptual and development phases where auto-
mobile manufacturers required clear process for implementation.
– Engineers and researchers were involved in the development of methodologies
to ensure safety compliance of the system at these phases.
The summary of the selected papers mapped to the standard phases is presented
in Table 1. Following section presents the gap analysis results between the ISO
26262 standard and the techniques identified from the selected papers.
4 Gap Analysis
A gap analysis helps to understand the shortcoming of existing approaches sug-
gested by literatures. The gap analysis is carried out between the ISO 26262
objectives of the Part 3 till Part 7 sub-phases.
Table 2. Schematic illustration of the gap between objectives of the ISO 26262 concept
phase and the respective techniques from the literature
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Only few methods are 
suitable for complex large 
scale systems and provides    
all possible solutions for 
decomposition. Need effort 
to reduce the processing 
time. 
To Identify and categorize 
the hazards and formulate 
the safety goals. Then 
derive the safety 
requirements from safety 
goals and allocate them to 
the architectural elements 
Various methods are developed 
that provides optimized possible 
combination of solutions for 
decomposition. Most of these 
methods takes more processing 
time. 
Effective ASIL Allocation 
and Decomposition to 
reduce the complexity and 
the development cost of 
the design. 
Separate methods are available 
to identify hazards. Whereas 
different methods are used to 
allocate the safety goals to the 
architectural elements.  
Need for enhanced tool 
that integrates the HARA 
analysis, derivation of  
safety requirements and 
safety goal allocation to the 
architectural elements. 
Key objective is to 
support an adequate 
understanding of the item 
so that the activities in 
subsequent phases can 
be performed. 
Need further analysis to 
understand the method used for 
item definition. 
Need further analysis to 
understand the gap. 
To derive the functional 
safety requirements and 
allocate them to the 
architectural elements of 
the item. 
Enhanced architecture 
description language techniques  
are developed that helps for 
allocation and reduce 
ambiguity. 
Need further analysis to 
understand the gap. 
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4.1 Gap Analysis for the Concept Phase
Table 2 summarizes the finding of a gap analysis for the concept phase. In the
area of Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA), various techniques are
available to identify and categorize the hazards. Techniques suggested by the
literature elucidate the way of estimating the hazard parameters (i.e., sever-
ity, exposure and controllability) and help to formulate the safety goals. After
identifying the safety goals, safety requirements can be derived for each goals.
Literature provides more options for writing the requirement by different nota-
tions [10]. Once the requirements are elicited, they are allocated to the relevant
architectural elements. This is performed using various architecture description
languages such as EAST-ADL [17] and AADL [9].
Though existing techniques fulfill the objectives given for HARA in the stan-
dard, more techniques are required to achieve this effort. There is no standard
common method or tool suggested by literature for meeting this objective. This
is found to be one of the gaps by contrasting the standard objectives and lit-
erature approaches. A gap analysis for other sub-phases of the concept phase
Table 3. Schematic illustration of the gap between standard objectives and techniques
in the area of product development phase
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Need for tool that 
integrates the requirement 
management with the  
safety validation. 
To develop the system 
design. To verify the 
system design and the 
technical safety concept 
comply with the TSR 
specification 
Separate tools like Medini 
Analysis are developed to ensure 
safety validation. All these tools  
Depends on the input of 
requirement management. 
To ensure all the safety 
cases generated in the 
concept phase are 
validated. 
As mentioned above, to verify 
the design and concepts 
compilation with the 
specification, fewer tools are 
developed that also ensures the 
traceability.   
Need for enhanced tool 
that integrates both design 
and verification process  
together. 
To verify whether TSR 
comply with the FSR. To 
manage the system 
requirements with 
complete traceability 
across the product life 
cycle. 
Fewer tools like IBM Rational 
Team Concert, PTC Integrity, 
Papyrus are developed for 
requirement specification to 
improve the traceability. But the 
detailed semantic traceability for 
each sub phase has not been 
explored. 
New Opportunity that 
integrates the requirement 
specification with Item  
Integration, testing and 
validation. 
To test compliance with 
each safety requirement 
and to verify the system 
design covering those 
requirements. 
Methods are available that 
ensures the requirement  
traceability and verify the 
system design compliance. 
Need for tool that combines 
all the sub phases of the 
product development. 
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i.e., Item Definition, Functional Safety Concept, and ASIL [13, 19, 20, 12, 18] is
presented in the Table 2.
4.2 Gap Analysis for the Product Development Phase
From the gap analysis of the product development phase, it is observed that there
are few tools [23, 21] suggested by literature and industrial technical report for
requirement specification. These tools support only for specific sub-phases and
there are more opportunities to integrate these tools with testing and validation
tools [4, 17]. By this integration, it becomes more sophisticated to perform all
the activities of a phase using single technique. This also gives clear way of
understanding the standard norms to the developers and verifying it by testers
using same platform. The finding of this gap analysis can be found in the Table 3
on the previous page.
Table 4. Schematic illustration of the gap between standard objectives and techniques
in the area of software development phase
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Need further analysis to 
understand the gap. 
 
To specify and implement 
the software units 
identifies as specified in 
accordance with software 
design and the associated  
software safety 
requirements. 
Need further analysis to 
understand the methods used 
for unit testing. 
 
To demonstrate the 
software units fulfil the 
software unit design 
specification and do not 
contain undesired 
functionality. 
Need further analysis to 
understand the methods used 
for implementation process. 
Need further analysis to 
understand the gap. 
To demonstrate that the 
embedded software fulfils 
the software safety 
requirements 
As mentioned in the previous 
phase, to verify the safety 
requirements with the software, 
fewer tools are developed that  
also ensures the traceability.   
Need for enhanced tool that 
integrates both design and 
verification process  
together. 
 
To develop and verify the 
architectural design that 
realizes the software 
safety requirements. 
Several methods such as GSN 
(Goal Structuring Notation) are 
used to reduce the developing  
Cost and time. This also helps 
for verification with the safety 
requirements. 
Need tools for integrating 
the architectural design and 
verification the safety 
 Requirements with the 
elements. 
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4.3 Gap Analysis for the Software Development Phase
Similar to the system architecture level, more techniques are used for the software
level [11]. Some of the common architecture description languages are EAST-
ADL [17] and AADL [9] which help to reduce the development cost and time.
In addition, such techniques provide a way to make the verification of safety
requirements easier. But there is no tool available that integrates both architec-
tural design and safety verification together. This is found to be one of the gap.
Table 4 on the previous page shows the gap analysis performed for the software
development phase.
4.4 Gap Analysis for the Hardware Development Phase
In the case of hardware development phase, only few literatures are published
about the development required for the evaluation of safety violation. These
literatures provide techniques mainly to support two claims. One is hardware
architectural metrics and second is evaluation of safety goal violations. Tech-
niques like UML based meta-model [9] support for design process and help to
Table 5. Schematic illustration of the gap between standard objectives and techniques
in the area of hardware development phase
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To develop and verify the 
architectural design that 
realizes the hardware 
safety requirements. 
 
Need more analysis to 
understand the techniques used 
for hardware design and 
ensuring the safety 
requirements compliance. 
Need further analysis to 
understand the gap. 
To demonstrate that the 
hardware fulfils the 
hardware safety 
requirements 
 
As mentioned in the product 
development phase, to verify 
the safety requirements with the 
components, fewer tools are 
developed that also ensures the 
traceability.   
 
Need for enhanced tool that 
integrates both design and 
verification process  
together. 
 
Need further analysis to 
understand the gap. 
 
Need more analysis to 
understand the evaluation 
techniques used along with the 
hardware architectural metrics. 
To demonstrate the 
compliance of the design 
with the safety metrics. 
To demonstrate the 
hardware components 
fulfil the hardware design 
specification and do not 
contain undesired 
functionality. 
 
Need more analysis to 
understand the hardware testing 
procedures. 
 
Need further analysis to 
understand the gap. 
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perform safety evaluation in a unified model based environment. The findings of
the gap analysis for the hardware development phase are shown in the Table 5.
Following section discusses the main results of the gap analysis.
5 Discussion
Based on the gap analysis, the shortcoming and challenges of the techniques
suggested by literature while fulfilling the standard objectives are found. In the
concept phase, gap analysis identified the lack of mature techniques that provide
wider possible solutions for ASIL decomposition. It showcases the opportunity
for integrating various techniques within the phase. For product development
phase, gap analysis shows similar results. There are tools used for each sub
phases of the product development but there is no common platform where all
sub phase activities can be performed. This tool integration could facilitate the
understanding and correct interpretation of the standard norms.
For the software and hardware development phase, same type of architecture
description languages, such as EAST-ADL and AADL, are used. But there is a
lack of common platform that supports both design and safety evaluations.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Since the ISO 26262 standard does not specify which techniques to be applied
in fulfilling the safety requirements, variety of techniques are developed for each
phase of the ISO 26262 standard. However, a general overview of existing and
emerging ISO 26262 related techniques is lacking. Therefore, in this paper, we
carried out a gap analysis to identify the challenges and future trends to fulfill
the ISO 26262 (part 3 to Part 7) safety objectives. We identified that the focus
of research techniques is for the concept and product development phases. How-
ever, more techniques are needed for fulfilling the objectives of the software and
hardware phases.
As a future work, we plan to conduct similar study on the remaining phases of
the ISO 26262 and develop a method for the software and hardware development
phases. Furthermore, our analysis focused on the research results rather than the
practical application of the standard. This requires further survey on the gap
between research results and the practical applicability of the standard to reflect
the actual situation in the automotive industry.
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